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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

:

ROBERT TODD WHITE,

:

Case No. 920248-CA

Priority No. 2

Defendant-Appellant. :
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant Robert Todd White appeals his conviction of
unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), 5837-8(2)(b)(ii) (1990).

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the

appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Defendant challenges the issuance of a warrant to
search his home, the authority to serve the warrant upon a "noknock" entry, and the authority to serve the warrant at night.
The State frames the issues on appeal as follows:
1. Was the Warrant to Search Defendant's Home
Supported by Probable Cause?

A magistrate's probable cause-based

decision to issue a search warrant is given great deference on
review.

Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S. Ct. 2317,

2331 (1983); State v. Babbell. 770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989);
State v. Weaver, 817 P.2d 830, 833 (Utah App. 1991).

Thus the

affidavit supporting the warrant is reviewed only for a
"substantial basis" upon which the magistrate could find probable
cause.

See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 915, 104 S. Ct.

3405, 3416 (1984).
2.

Did the Magistrate Properly Authorize Unannounced,

"No-Knock" Service of the Search Warrant?

As set forth more

fully in the body of this brief, a magistrate's "no-knock"
decision should also be reviewed with great deference.

The

warrant affidavit, however, must make a particularized showing
that no-knock service is necessary.

State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730,

732-33 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991).
3. Was any Problem with the Magistrate's Authorization
of Nighttime Service of the Warrant Rendered Moot, or Harmless
Error, by Actual Service during the Daytime?

As set forth in the

body of this brief, this is a question of law, reviewable without
deference to the trial court's ruling.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
reads as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Utah's "no-knock" search statute, Utah Code Ann. § 7723-10 (1990), states in pertinent part:

2

When a search warrant has been issued .
. . the officer executing the warrant may use
such force as is reasonably necessary to
enter:
•

• •

(2) Without notice of his authority and
purpose, if the magistrate issuing the
warrant directs in the warrant that the
officer need not give notice. The magistrate
shall so direct only upon proof, under oath,
that the object of the search may be quickly
destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or that
physical harm may result to any person if
notice were given.
The text of any other constitutional, statutory, or rule
provisions pertinent to the resolution of this appeal will be
contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant Robert Todd White was charged with unlawful
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a
second degree felony (R. 16J.1

He moved to suppress evidence

seized in a warranted search of his home, arguing that the
warrant was unsupported by probable cause, and that authority to
serve the warrant on a no-knock, nighttime basis was improperly
granted (R. 21). The motion was denied (R. 83).
Defendant then pleaded no contest to a reduced charge
of possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), 58-378(2)(b)(ii) (1990) (R. 76). As permitted under State v. Serv,
758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), defendant reserved the right to
appeal the denial of his motion to suppress (id.).
x

His zero to

The trial court pleadings record is R. 1-104; the transcript
of the suppression motion hearing is R. 105-202.
3

five year sentence was suspended subject to probation and payment
of a fine and surcharges (R. 86). This disposition, in turn, was
stayed upon issuance of a certificate of probable cause pending
this appeal, brought on timely notice (R. 86, 95, 96).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Warrant and the Search
The warrant affidavit (R. 28-33, Appendix 2 to Br. of
Appellant) was submitted by Detective Bill McCarthy, an
experienced narcotics investigator with the West Valley City
Police (R. 30). The affidavit recited that a confidential
informant, "CI," had reported a West Valley duplex apartment to
be a cocaine dealing site.
According to the affidavit, CI's spouse had purchased
cocaine in the apartment, most recently within the preceding five
days (R. 30). While CI had not been inside the apartment, CI had
seen the spouse enter it, then exit with cocaine which the spouse
then ingested (id.).

The spouse had also told CI that persons

inside the apartment were the spouse's cocaine source (id..).

CI

reported that the spouse had been purchasing cocaine at the
apartment for at least the past six months (R. 31).
CI's information had been corroborated in several ways.
First, Detective McCarthy checked the spouse's criminal record,
uncovering a prior narcotics arrest (R. 31). Next, a "second
source of information," also related to CI's spouse, had
confirmed that the spouse had a long history of cocaine abuse
(id.).

Like CI, the "second source" had also seen the spouse at
4

the apartment, and heard the spouse admit to purchasing cocaine
there (id.)-

Finally, Detective McCarthy had watched the

apartment, observing vehicles arrive and stay for "a very short
period of time," consistent with narcotics trafficking (id..)*
McCarthy's warrant affidavit also asked permission to
serve the warrant on a no-knock basis and at night (R. 32). The
affidavit recited that the items to be seized, including
narcotics, packaging material, paraphernalia, cash, and
transaction records, could be "very easily destroyed" (R. 31-32,
33).

It also recited that, according to CI, CI's spouse had been

threatened by the cocaine suppliers at the apartment when the
spouse had been late in paying for the cocaine; further, the
spouse had threatened CI against reporting the cocaine
transactions to police (R. 31).
Finally, the affidavit recited McCarthy's "firm belief"
that no-knock warrant service was safer.

This was based on his

experience in serving "numerous narcotics search warrants w[h]ere
weapons have been readily available to the occupants," and his
knowledge "that more and more narcotics dealers are arming
themselves to protect the sales operations from other
dealers/users" (R. 32-33).
Based on the foregoing affidavit information, the
magistrate issued a warrant to search the apartment (R. 25-27,
Appendix 2 to Br. of Appellant).

The warrant was authorized for

service "without notice of authority or purpose" and "at any time
of the day" (R. 25). However, while served in "no-knock"
5

fashion, the warrant was not served at night, but at about 10:45
in the morning of February 1, 1991 (R. 114, 127). The search
revealed "five bindles of suspected cocaine" in defendant's
possession, leading to the charges against him (R. 17).
The Motion to Suppress
Defendant's motion to suppress alleged the absence of
probable cause to issue the warrant, and inadequate justification
for no-knock, nighttime service (R. 21). Defendant also alleged
that the warrant affidavit contained "false statements and
material omissions of fact," but did not specify any particular
falsehoods (R. 22). Finally, while the motion recited that it
was based upon both the fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution
(R. 21), it was unaccompanied by any articulated argument for
separate analysis under these two provisions.
At the hearing of the motion to suppress, the
prosecutor cited Utah case law to the effect that the burden of
proof rested with defendant (R. 109-10).

Accordingly, the trial

court assigned defendant to the task of proving the invalidity of
the warrant (R. 113).
Upon direct examination by defense counsel, Detective
McCarthy readily revealed the names of "CI" and the "second
source" who had provided the information recited in the warrant
affidavit.

Those names are not fully repeated in this brief, out

of concern for the informants' safety.

However, CI turned out to

be "Mrs. Jimmy;" her husband, "Jimmy," was the cocaine-habituated
6

"spouse" identified in McCarthy's affidavit.

The "second source"

turned out to be Jimmy's parents.
Detective McCarthy explained that his investigation had
begun in response to Mrs. Jimmy's report of Jimmy's cocaine
purchases (R. 117). She and Jimmy's parents had independent
knowledge of Jimmy's transactions at the duplex apartment,
although they had not directly witnessed those transactions (R.
120).

Utility checks on the apartment had not revealed

defendant's name, and McCarthy acknowledged that he had been
unable to identify who actually lived in the apartment when he
sought the warrant (R. 121).
Turning to the manner of warrant service, McCarthy
reported the daytime, no-knock service.

Because entry had been

effected by a "SWAT" team, McCarthy could not say whether the
apartment door had actually been broken open (R. 127-129).

He

explained the no-knock, nighttime service request in the
affidavit as motivated by the reported threats toward Jimmy and
Mrs. Jimmy, plus his judgment that such entry was "always safer"
(R. 129, 131).2

This judgment was probed by defense counsel,

and met with some skepticism by the trial court, upon its own
questions to the detective (R. 133-34, 170-73).
At the end of the hearing, the trial court ordered
memoranda from the parties on the issue of whether actual daytime

2

Detective McCarthy also explained that he only expected to
find small, readily-disposable quantities of drugs on the premises
(R. 129-30). However, this information was not clearly set forth
in his affidavit.
7

service of the warrant mooted any problem with an improper
nighttime authorization (R. 196). Also at the end of the
hearing, defense counsel asserted, "One other thing I wanted to
say, my argument is based on the Utah Constitution as well as the
United States Constitution" (R. 199).
The* parties submitted the requested memoranda (R. 3941, 54-59).

Defendant's memorandum cited Utah's statute

governing nighttime search warrant service, but again, did not
articulate whether the Utah Constitution was necessarily more
restrictive on this question than federal law (R. 39-41).
Upon review of the memoranda and the arguments at the
motion hearing, the trial court issued a written memorandum
decision (R. 66-70, reproduced at the appendix to this brief).
The court determined that the affidavit, "taken as a whole,"
established probable cause to issue the warrant (R. 67).
Revisiting its concerns about the safety justification for noknock service, the court acknowledged its lack of expertise:
[T]he Court does not claim any expertise in
police procedures, nor does the Court claim
any expertise in the execution of "no knock"
warrants and the hazards related thereto, and
the evidence the Court has before it is from
a police professional who has expressed his
opinions, stated the reasons therefor[], and
the Court is not at liberty to ignore that
evidence, absent some legitimate reason to do
so, and no legitimate legal reason appears to
exist.
(R. 67-68).

Therefore, the trial court ruled that the no-knock

service had been properly authorized (R. 68). It further held
that actual daytime service mooted any possible problem with the
8

magistrate's authorization of a nighttime search (id,)«
Accordingly, the motion to suppress was denied.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In the trial court, defendant did not articulate a
separate state constitutional analysis in support of his motion
to suppress. Accordingly, federal fourth amendment law controls
this appeal, and requires that deference be paid to the
magistrate's probable cause ruling.

Deference to both the

magistrate and the trial court's affirmation of the magistrate's
decision is appropriate as a matter of proper respect toward
these front-line judicial decision makers.
Defendant fails to show that the magistrate and the
trial court both clearly erred in making and affirming the
probable cause determination.

His "informant unreliability"

argument fails because the informants in question here, concerned
relatives of a cocaine-dependent individual, can be presumed
reliable.

Also, Detective McCarthy's independent investigation

sufficiently corroborated the information provided by those
informants.

Finally, the "particularity" argument raised on

appeal was not presented in the trial court, and in any event
fails on its merits.
As for the no-knock service, heightened deference is
due to the magistrate, with an emphasis on reasonableness, not
probable cause.

The trial court correctly observed that judicial

officers lack expertise to judge the safest means of serving
search warrants.

Therefore, given officer expertise, plus
9

specific information tending to show that the particular search
may pose physical danger to anybody involved, no-knock service
authority should be upheld on review.

Also, because defendant

revealed no details of how this no-knock search was actually
effected, full review of its reasonableness is difficult.
Finally, the trial court correctly held that daytime
service of this warrant mooted, or rendered harmless, any
possible error in the nighttime service authorization.
holding is supported by case law and policy.

Such

With respect to the

latter, police cannot commit misconduct when they choose to carry
out a search in a less intrusive manner than that authorized by
the magistrate.

Such choice should be encouraged, by not

suppressing evidence when possible magistrate error has actually
been corrected by police officers.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE MAGISTRATE'S PROBABLE CAUSE FINDING, AND
THE TRIAL COURT'S AFFIRMATION OF THAT
FINDING, SHOULD BE REAFFIRMED ON APPEAL.
Defendant first challenges the magistrate's probable
cause determination.

Under the correct, deferential standard of

appellate review, the challenge should be rejected.
A.

Settled Fourth Amendment Law Requires Deferential
Review of the Magistrate's Probable Cause
Determination•
Under the fourth amendment, a magistrate's probable

cause-based decision to issue a search warrant, so long as based
upon specific facts in the supporting affidavit, is reversed on
10

review only if it is clearly erroneous.
P.2d 987, 990 (Utah 1989).

State v. Babbell, 770

Accord United States v. Leon, 468

U.S. 897, 914-15, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3416 (1984), and State v.
Weaver, 817 P.2d 830, 833 (Utah App. 1991) ("great deference"
accorded to magistrate's determination). In making that
decision, a magistrate must "make a practical, common-sense
decision whether, given all the circumstances . . . there is a
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place."

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,

235, 103 S Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983).

Accord Weaver, 817 P.2d at 833

(probability or "reasonable belief," not certainty, is standard
for issuance of warrant).
1. Waiver of State Constitutional Argument.
At some length, defendant argues that this Court should
not defer to the magistrate's probable cause ruling (Br. of
Appellant at 7-13).

His argument depends heavily on the appendix

to State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 817
P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), and on a concurring opinion in Weaver that
criticizes the deferential fourth amendment approach.

He

therefore asks this Court to apply non-deferential search warrant
review under Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution (Br.
of Appellant at 13).
The first problem with defendant's argument is that he
did not properly articulate a separate, more rigorous analysis
under the state constitution than under the fourth amendment.
His written motion to suppress and his argument at the hearing of
11

that motion did no more than nominally cite Article I, section 14
(R. 21, 199). His memorandum in support of that motion, asking
to invalidate the warrant "on State constitutional grounds" (R.
41), actually relied on Utah statutes, not constitutional
provisions, and was limited to the narrow issue of possible
mootness of the nighttime warrant service authorization.
Under these circumstances, defendant has not preserved
his state constitution-based warrant challenge for review by this
Court.

See State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1272-73 & n.5 (Utah

App. 1990) (state constitutional arguments must be properly
articulated and thoughtfully analyzed in the trial courts to
allow appellate review).

He failed to prevent the now-asserted

error by timely drawing it to the trial court's attention:

"Excuse m e . . . I know the game's almost over, but
just for the record, I don't think my buzzer was
working properly."

12

Accord State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991) (trial
court must be given first opportunity to correct its errors).
Nor has he demonstrated "plain error" or "exceptional
circumstances" that might afford him relief from the appellate
waiver normally resulting from such failure.

See State v.

Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922-26 (Utah App. 1991).
2.

Reasons for Deferential Appellate Review.

While defendant's state constitution-based argument
should be rejected on the basis of waiver alone, revisitation of
considerations supporting deferential appellate review of search
warrants seems appropriate.

This question has been debated by

the State and counsel for defendant on several occasions,
including State v. Rosenbaum, No. 910514-CA, and State v. Ruiz,
No. 920126-CA, now pending before this Court.

The State's

position in those cases, briefly put, is that appellate deference
is proper, as a matter of respect for magistrates and trial court
judges.

Those judicial officers, sworn to uphold the federal and

state constitutions in a fashion that favors neither the State
nor criminal suspects, should be presumed to have done so absent
the clearest showing to the contrary.
Here defendant implies, without directly asserting the
point, that the foregoing presumption is invalid.

He refers, for

example, to "meaningful," "neutral and detached," and "thorough"
judicial review of warrant affidavits, as if to suggest that only
appellate courts, not magistrates and trial courts, are capable
of such review (Br. of Appellant at 7, 12). He also suggests
13

that police officers may "forum shop" for magistrates less
inclined toward, or less capable of, careful scrutiny of warrant
affidavits (Br. of Appellant at 10).
Supporting his "forum shopping" theory, defendant asks
this Court to "take judicial notice of the fact that Utah
magistrates do not uniformly have the opportunity to develop
expertise in issuing search warrants" (Br. of Appellant at 9).
Not only does this "fact" not seem "capable of ready and accurate
determination" under Rule 201(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, it
appears to be untrue.

Under Rule 3-403, Utah Code of Judicial

Administration, "all judges, commissioners and court staff,"
which would seem to encompass magistrates, receive thirty hours
of orientation upon appointment, and thirty hours per year of
continuing judicial education.

Thus it appears that magistrates

are uniformly required to develop their skills.
If non-deferential review of search warrants is ever to
be implemented, then, it should be done on some basis other than
unsupported innuendo to the effect that magistrates and trial
courts cannot "meaningfully" assess warrant affidavits in the
required detached and neutral fashion.

Until and unless Utah's

appellate courts assume front-line responsibility for probable
cause determinations, deference to the judicial officers who now
perform that function should be maintained.3
3

Indeedir a procedure might be developed in which warrants are
issued only by "on call" appellate panels, utilizing modern
electronic communication.
Similarly, after-the-fact search and
seizure review might limit trial courts to finding such "underlying
facts" as may be needed (presumably none in the case of warrant
14

Accordingly, especially in cases involving warrantsupported searches, defendants seeking to suppress the fruits of
a search should be held to a heavy burden of persuasion, under
both federal and state constitutional standards.

See Franks v.

Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 2684 (1978) (search
warrant presumed valid).

In the trial court, such a defendant

should be required to show clear error in the magistrate's
issuance of the warrant.

See State v. Bankhead, 30 Utah 2d 135,

514 P.2d 800, 802 & n.l (1973).

Upon failing to carry that

burden in the trial court, defendant's burden should be even
heavier on appeal.
B.

The Trial Court Correctly Rejected Defendant's
Challenge to the Magistrate's Issuance of the
Search Warrant.
Defendant correctly states that review of a probable

cause determination examines the "totality of the circumstances,"
which may include "informant reliability" issues (Br. of
Appellant at 14-15).

See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238,

103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983); State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099,
1101-02 (Utah 1985); Weaver, 817 P.2d at 832-33.

This case

appropriately calls for a look at informant reliability, for
Detective McCarthy's investigation did not directly reveal
defendant's criminal behavior.

Compare State v. Purser, 828 P.2d

515, 516 (Utah App. 1992) (defendant sold drugs in "controlled
buy" arranged by officer).

Nevertheless, bearing in mind the

affidavits, cf.. Weaver, 817 P.2d at 836), followed by immediate
certification of the case to an appellate panel for the probable
cause conclusion to be derived from those facts.
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proper burden of proof and standard of review, the trial court's
denial of defendant's motion to suppress should be affirmed.
1.

The Motion Hearing:

Opportunities Lost.

In being afforded an evidentiary hearing to challenge
the search warrant, defendant was actually aided more than he
deserved in his motion to suppress.

Because his motion contained

only a bare assertion that the warrant affidavit contained
material falsehoods, he was not entitled to put on any evidence.
See Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72, 98 S. Ct. at 2684-85, adopted in
State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1986) (absent specific
threshold showing of deliberate material falsity by warrant
affiant, defendant challenging probable cause cannot have
evidentiary hearing).

Defendant could have been limited to

arguing only the sufficiency of the warrant affidavit.
Defendant received another "gift" when Detective
McCarthy disclosed the identities of the confidential informants
who had given information used in the warrant affidavit.
by no means obliged to give this information.
at 519-20 (citing authorities).

He was

Purser, 828 P.2d

Once they were identified,

however, defendant could have called Mrs. Jimmy, Jimmy's parents,
and even the cocaine-habituated Jimmy himself to testify at the
hearing of the motion to suppress.

In short, at the time of that

hearing, the validity of the warrant was no longer dependent upon
"unnamed police informers," cj£. State v. Treadwav, 28 Utah 2d
160, 499 P.2d 846, 848 (1972).

The informants were named, and

could have been called as witnesses to ascertain whether
16

Detective McCarthy truthfully recounted their statements in his
warrant affidavit, and to test their reliability.
Defendant thus had ample opportunity, well beyond what
could be expected, to challenge this warrant in the trial court.
His failure to take full advantage of that opportunity should be
held against him on appeal, especially in regard to his
"informant unreliability" argument.
2.

Informant Reliability Was Adequately Shown.

In State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284 (Utah App. 1990), this
Court, citing Treadwav, reiterated the principle that "[c]ourts
view the testimony of citizen informers with less rigid scrutiny
than the testimony of police informers.

. . . This is because

citizen informers, unlike police informers, volunteer information
out of concern for the community and not for personal benefit."
798 P.2d at 286. Accordingly, the "concerned citizen" informant
in Brown was deemed sufficiently reliable to not require "rigid
scrutiny," i,d. at 286-87.
In this case, Detective McCarthy's affidavit reveals
that his informants should be deemed even more reliable than the
"concerned citizen" in Brown.

These informants were concerned

not just with community well-being, but with that of a close
family member, "Jimmy."

Common sense strongly suggests that

their motive in reporting the apparent criminal activity was not
some kind of "revenge," but more likely an understandable desire
to interrupt their loved one's drug habit.

The affidavit also

reflected that the informants had observed independent instances
17

in which Jimmy apparently purchased cocaine in the suspect
apartment.

Accordingly, the informants corroborated each others'

reports, each buttressing the reliability of the other.
3.

Independent Corroboration of Informant Reports.

Detective McCarthy's independent investigation also
supported the magistrate's finding of Ma fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime" would be found in the
apartment, Gates, 462 U.S. at 235, 103 S. Ct. at 2332.

While

McCarthy did not directly confirm criminal activity in the
apartment, he did uncover independent circumstantial evidence
supporting his informants' reports.

Jimmy, the "spouse"

identified in the affidavit, was independently found to have a
criminal narcotics record (R. 31). Traffic to and from the
apartment was observed to fit a pattern consistent with drug
trafficking (id.).
Nor was the "hearsay upon hearsay" nature of the
informants' reports a bar to issuance of the warrant.

See

Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191-92 (double hearsay, if reliable, not a
problem in warrant issuance); Utah R. Evid. 805, 1101(b)(3).
This was especially so once Jimmy's history of drug abuse was
independently confirmed, making it more reasonable to infer that
his visits to the apartment were indeed for illicit purposes.
4.

Particularity Requirement.

Defendant also complains that the warrant and affidavit
failed to identify the apartment to be searched with sufficient
particularity (Br. of Appellant at 17). This issue was not
18

raised in the motion to suppress, nor pursued at the hearing of
that motion, and was therefore waived.
waived:

It was also appropriately

the premises to be searched are clearly identified by

number and directional coordinates as but one of two "duplex"
apartments (R. 25). Clearly, apartment 3720 was to be searched;
apartment 3718 was to be left alone.
In a novel but also unpreserved argument, defendant
asserts that the warrant affidavit should have included specific
evidence that the contraband to be seized could not have been
obtained by subpoena (Br. of Appellant at 19, citing Utah Code
Ann. S 77-23-3(2) (1990)).

Briefly, it seems unlikely that

someone suspected of dealing in illicit drugs would comply with a
subpoena requiring him or her to surrender evidence of such
activity.

Indeed, unless such a person were foolish beyond

belief, he or she would be expected, upon receiving such a
subpoena, to expeditiously conceal or destroy such evidence.
Recitation of the likely failure of the subpoena process, then,
hardly seems necessary in a case like this one.
5.

Summary:

Totality of the Circumstances.

All in all, McCarthy's affidavit showed the following:
a confirmed narcotics abuser was reported, reasonably reliably,
to be purchasing cocaine at a specific apartment, where other
traffic consistent with drug dealing was also observed.

These

factors, in their totality, provided a substantial basis for the
magistrate's probable cause finding.

The federally-required

deference to that finding, coupled with affirmation of that
19

finding by the trial court, should obligate this Court to
reaffirm the issuance of the warrant.

This is so even if this

Court, had the warrant affidavit been presented to it in the
first place, might have not issued the warrant.
POINT TWO
THE MAGISTRATE'S AUTHORIZATION OF NO-KNOCK
WARRANT SERVICE SHOULD BE REAFFIRMED.
Defendant next contends that the magistrate erred in
authorizing "no-knock" service of the search warrant.

This

contention was correctly rejected by the trial court.
A.

No-Knock Warrant Service Authority Should be
Deferentially Reviewed for Reasonableness.
By its terms, Utah's no-knock statute comes into play

only "[w]hen a search warrant has been issued . . .."
Ann. § 77-23-10 (1990).

Utah Code

Its focus is not probable cause, but

only the question of how the search will be conducted.

See State

v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700, 703 (Utah 1988) (no-knock challenge did
not assail underlying search, but only "the manner of entry").
The no-knock statute requires "proof" that if the search is
cinnounced, evidence "may" be lost, or that physical harm to any
person "may" result.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10(2).

Defendant stresses the no-knock "proof" requirement
(Br. of Appellant at 22). However, the "may" language should be
emphasized, giving rise to a lower standard of proof for no-knock
authority than for issuance of the underlying warrant.

After

all, the warrant is a judicial order to search a particular
place, Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-1 (1990), based upon probable
20

cause.

The no-knock statute should not revisit probable cause:

instead# it should be viewed as setting the parameters of
reasonableness in following the judicial order.
In assessing the reasonableness of a no-knock request,
deference to the police, charged with carrying out the search, is
appropriate.

See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 257, 99

S. Ct. 1682, 1693 (1978) (question of how to conduct warrantauthorized search "is generally left to the discretion of the
executing officers," subject to reasonableness requirement).
They, not reviewing judges, possess the hands-on expertise in
conducting searches.

They, not reviewing judges, are directly

responsible for protecting the physical safety of everybody
affected by this hazardous undertaking.

In this case the trial

judge, reviewing the no-knock request, properly acknowledged his
own lack of expertise and upheld the no-knock service authorized
by the magistrate (R. 67-68).
Consistent with the position it has advanced in State
v. Rosenbaum, No. 910514-CA (pending), and with State v. Rowe,
806 P.2d 730, 732-33 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 817 P.2d 327
(Utah 1991), the State believes that deference to an officer's
no-knock warrant service request must have appropriate
limitations.

Thus while officer expertise with searches

generally must be considered in screening or reviewing such a
request, some additional evidence, particular to the case at
hand, must be presented to justify or affirm a no-knock request.
Rosenbaum, Br. of Appellee at 22; Rowe, 806 P.2d at 733 ("sparse"
21

affidavit contained sufficient case-specific information to
support no-knock service).
Subject to the foregoing limitation, then, no-knock
authority, granted by the warrant-issuing magistrate and affirmed
by the trial court, should be reviewed on appeal with the utmost
deference.

Such authority should be reversed only upon a

determination that it was clearly unreasonable to grant it.
B.

Th€* Warrant Affidavit Adequately Supported NoKnock Service Authority.
With the foregoing standards in mind, this Court should

reaffirm the magistrate's no-knock authorization.

With regard to

general experience, the warrant affidavit established that
Detective McCarthy had extensive experience in the preparation
and service of narcotics search warrants (R. 30). That
experience had led him to conclude that no-knock warrant service
is "always safer," because narcotics dealers are often armed (R.
32-33).A

This likelihood has also been noted by Utah's

appellate courts.

See State v. Dorsev, 731 P.2d 1085, 1092 (Utah

1986) (Zimmerman, J., concurring); State v. Leonard. 825 P.2d
664, 670 n.9 (Utah App. 1991), petition for cert, filed. No.
920140 (Utah March 11, 1992).

Thus a general but well-recognized

physical safety risk was present.

A

See Commonwealth v. Grubb, 595 A.2d 133, 135 n.3 (Pa. Super.
1991) (officer had found weapons ninety percent of the time, over
course of 200 searches). Interestingly, at the hearing on the
motion to suppress, McCarthy retreated somewhat from his assertion
that no-knock service is always safer, acknowledging that "some"
narcotics searches do not require such service (R. 132).
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There was also a case-specific safety risk. Mrs.
"Jimmy" had reported threats from the occupants of the apartment,
directed toward Jimmy and, through Jimmy, toward her (R. 31, 32).
Admittedly, this did not constitute conclusive proof that the
police search would be met with violence; however, such certainty
is not and should not be required.

Where a safety justification

for a no-knock search is presented, an officer's request to take
precautions need only be reasonable.

See State v. Rovbal, 716

P.2d 291, 293-94 (Utah 1986) (affirming the reasonableness of
precautions when officers "enter hostile environs").

Thus the

specific, if slender, possibility of violence in this case should
be held sufficient to uphold no-knock warrant service.
Section 77-23-10(2) also allows no-knock warrant
service upon a showing "that the object of the search may be
quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted" upon announcement of
the search.

Here the suspected criminal activity, cocaine

dealing, would seem to suggest ready disposal of the evidence.
See Rowe, 806 P.2d at 733 (small amount of drugs suspected; noknock authority upheld).

Compare State v. Pierson, 472 N.W.2d

898, 903 (Neb. 1991) (search for slot machine; no-knock entry not
needed).

Unfortunately, while Detective McCarthy expressed his

belief that he would only find small, quickly-disposable
quantities of drugs at the apartment during the hearing of the
suppression motion (R. 126), he did not clearly set this out in
his warrant affidavit.

Further, given that he also sought

evidence of a major sales operation—packaging material, cash,
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and records (R. 32-33)—it seems that the "ready disposability"
inference was rather weak.

Accordingly, this no-knock search

depended primarily on the better-articulated safety concerns.
Regarding those concerns, where a magistrate determines
that the risk of physical harm to persons outweighs problems of
fright or property damage resulting from a no-knock search, as
contemplated by section 77-23-10(2), that determination should be
given deference.

The trial court correctly deferred to the

magistrate's decision.

This Court should do the same, and

reaffirm the no-knock service authority in this search warrant.
C.

There is Insufficient Evidence to Fully Review the
Propriety of this No-Knock Search.
It should also be noted that defendant failed to elicit

adequate evidence upon which the reasonableness of this search
can be assessed.

The reasonableness of a warranted search

"depends on the facts of the case."

Buck. 756 P.2d at 703.

See

also State v. Sessions, 583 P.2d 44, 45 (Utah 1978) ("a defendant
must submit some evidence in support of his motion to suppress or
the motion would be denied").

Defendant's sole witness at the

hearing of his motion to suppress, Detective McCarthy, could not
relate the exact manner of this no-knock search:

he only knew

that the apartment door was "probably forced open" (R. 127).
With reasonableness the standard, the manner in which a
search is actually conducted must be known if after-the-fact
review is to be meaningful.

Even a "no-knock" search, more

properly a search "without notice of [the officer's] authority
and purpose" under section 77-23-10, can be carried out in a wide
24

variety of more or less reasonable ways.

On the one hand,

searching officers might find the door to the premises open or
unlocked, or might use a ruse to obtain entry.

On the other,

extreme violence, well beyond what a magistrate would contemplate
in authorizing no-knock service, might be imagined.
In short, no-knock searches should not all be presumed
to be the same.

Defendants wishing to challenge no-knock

authority should bear this in mind, and present sufficient
evidence to meaningfully support such challenges.
POINT THREE
ACTUAL SERVICE OF THE WARRANT DURING THE
DAYTIME MOOTED, OR RENDERED HARMLESS, ANY
ERROR IN THE MAGISTRATE'S AUTHORIZATION OF A
NIGHTTIME SEARCH.
A significant piece of evidence that defendant did
elicit was the fact that this search was carried out during
daylight hours, even though the magistrate had authorized
nighttime warrant service (R. 34, 127). The trial court held
that such actual service mooted any possible problem with the
nighttime authority.

Assuming, without deciding, that nighttime

service was improperly authorized, that holding was correct.
In State v. Buck. 756 P.2d 700 (Utah 1988), officers
conducted a warranted residential search upon a no-knock entry,
failing to recognize that their warrant did not authorize such
entry.
n.l.

However, nobody was home at the time. Id. at 700-01 &

The Utah Supreme Court held that because nobody was home

when the search occurred, the safety and privacy concerns
underlying the normal "knock-and-announce" requirement had not
25

been implicated.

JEd. Therefore, suppression of the seized

evidence was not required.

Id. at 702-03 (citing authorities).

Under Buck, if a search warrant is executed in a
clearly unauthorized manner, but privacy and safety interests are
infringed no more than they would be in a routine search, the
fruits of the search are admissible as evidence.

It should

follow that if a no-knock or nighttime entry is. authorized in a
warrant, but officers do not actually execute the warrant on such
basis, the s€*ized evidence is also admissible.

Indeed, in People

v. Barber, 449 N.Y.S. 2d 140, 145 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982), evidence
was not suppressed where police did not rely upon an improper noknock authorization, but instead announced themselves when
serving the warrant.

Similarly, in State v. Sherrick, 98 Ariz.

46, 402 P.2d 1, 9 (1965) (en banc), evidence seized during a
daylight search was not suppressed, even though the warrant
improperly authorized a nighttime search.
Cases such as Buck, Barber, and Sherrick stand for the
principle that where violation of a criminal procedure rule does
not violate a "fundamental" constitutional right, suppression of
evidence obtained through such violation is not required.

See

State v. Fixel, 744 P.2d 1366, 1368-69 (Utah 1987) (officer
improperly acted outside his statutory authority; because he did
not thereby violate defendant's "fundamental" rights, evidence
was admissible).

Similarly here, no "fundamental" right of

defendant to avoid a nighttime search was violated:
search occurred.
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no nighttime

Further, suppression of evidence under these
circumstances would actually deter laudable police conduct.

The

officers here conducted this search in a less intrusive manner
than authorized in their warrant.

If the seized evidence is

nevertheless suppressed, in some effort to deter magistrate
error, police officers will have no incentive to effectively
correct such errors themselves.
Clearly the better approach, if the concern is
ultimately with protecting citizens against actual unreasonable
searches, is to leave room for officers to re-think, and not rely
upon, questionable magistrate orders.

Indeed, United States v.

Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984), avoids suppression
where officers reasonably rely upon a warrant that is later
invalidated.

That being the case, it is surely wise policy to

avoid suppression where officers do not rely upon some provision
in a search warrant that might be questionable.

Indeed, such

officer conduct should be encouraged.
"Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does
not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be
disregarded."

Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a).

If the magistrate erred

in authorizing a nighttime search, such error should be
disregarded.

The trial court's ruling comported with this rule,

and should be affirmed.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the order denying
defendant's motion to suppress evidence, and his subsequent
conviction, should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this "2> day of September,
1992.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
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^
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Appendix
(Trial Court's Memorandum Decision)

Third Judicial District

JAN 2 3 1992

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,

:

CASE NO.

vs.

911900752
911900753

:

MARK S. BLAHA,
ROBERT TODD WHITE,

:

Defendants.

Before
above-named,

the

Court

through

is

their

the

Motion

counsel

of

of

the

record,

defendants
to

suppress

evidence seized as a result of a search warrant authorizing
search of the premises known as 3720 South 3375 West in Salt
Lake County, State of Utah.

The warrant was issued on January

31, 1991 after presentation to Circuit Court Judge William A.
Thorne, acting as magistrate of the Third Circuit Court.
The matter was before the Court on December 4, 1991, where
evidence was presented and oral argument had.

Following oral

argument, the Court indicated that it would take the matter
under advisement and allow counsel time to brief a legal issue
that had arisen based upon the evidence received during the
hearing on the question of whether or not the daytime execution
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PAGE TWO

of this warrant moots any potential defects that may have been
part

of the

execution,.

issuance of the warrant

relating

to nighttime

The parties have filed their respective pleadings,

the Court has considered the same, and being fully advised,
enters the following Memorandum Decision.
The

Court

is

satisfied

that

the

allegations

in

the

Affidavit, taken as a whole, are sufficient to authorize the
issuance of a search warrant.
that

the

provision

evidence

supports

in

search

the

execution is satisfactory.

The Court is further satisfied
a

finding

warrant

that

the

authorizing

additional
"no

knock"

The €>vidence suggests that the "no

knock" warrant in this case was appropriate because of the
potential of the destruction of evidence, particularly where
small amounts may be involved, and for the safety of not only
officers executing the warrant, but the persons who may be on
the premises when the warrant is executed.
While the Court expressed concerns in its questioning of
the State's witnesses in this matter regarding the concept of
safety,

the

Court

does

not

claim

any

expertise

procedures, nor does the Court claim any
execution

of

"no

knock"

warrants

and

the

in police

expertise

in the

hazards

related

thereto, and the evidence the Court has before it is from a
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police professional who has expressed his opinions, stated the
reasons therefore, and the Court is not at liberty to ignore
that evidence, absent some legitimate reason to do so, and no
legitimate legal reason appears to exist.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that there is
sufficient basis for the issuance of the "no knock" special
provisions of this warrant.
Turning

to

the

question

of

whether

or

sufficient basis to authorize the execution

not

there

is

of the warrant

during the nighttime, the Court is satisfied that any potential
defects in the contents of the supporting documentation and the
warrant authorizing its execution at nighttime has been mooted,
inasmuch as the warrant was not executed in the nighttime, but
rather during the daytime.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes that the
defendants' Motions to Suppress must and should be denied.
Counsel for the State is to prepare an Order indicating the
Court's

denial

of the

defendants' Motion

to

Suppress, and

present the same to the Court for review and signature pursuant
to the Code of Judicial Administration.
This matter is further scheduled on the Court's calendar to
determine

what

additional

dates, trial

or

otherwise,

are
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necessary to bring this matter to a conclusion.

Counsel and

the defendants are to be present at the/date indicated in the
attached notice.
Dated this &3< day of January,/1992.

'TIMOTHY R. HANSON
DISTRICT COURT JUQ$E
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Memorandum
this ^

Decision,

to the following,

r day of January, 1992:

Kenneth R. Updegrove
Deputy County Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
2001 S. State, Suite S3700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200
Roger K. Scowcroft
Elizabeth A. Bowman
Attorneys for Defendants
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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